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ARGUMENTS
I.

ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND GOVERNMENTAL
INTRUSION INTO AND INTERFERENCE WITH OTT'S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL

A.

OTT HAS PROVED AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
The State's argument regarding the actual conflict of interest, State's brief at 25-28, does

not account for the critical facts that Wilson introduced Caine's potential appointment as
counsel for Ott to the Indigent Defense Trust Fund Board and also spoke to his fellow board
members both during and outside the board meetings regarding their hiring Caine to represent
Ott (R 2011-2012, 2019-2020; R2166:33-34, 79-80). Wilson's abstaining from voting on the
ultimate board decision to hire Caine (R2166: 33-34, 79-80) likely reflected his recognition that
as a thirty year close friend of Caine's who was both a client and co-counsel of Caine's in the
civil suit which was ongoing at the time of the criminal prosecution, and as Ott's prosecutor,
Wilson had a conflict of interest regarding Caine's appointment to represent Ott. He helped
draft the contract Caine signed reflecting that Caine had no conflict of interest in accepting the
appointment (R. 2166: 33-34, 79-80).
The State's claim that it was after the 23B remand that "the parties learned that
defendant's lead counsel represented the lead prosecutor's wife in a civil suit during the time he
represented Defendant," State's brief at 18, sidesteps the truth - that Wilson, who was the lead
prosecutor for the State, and Caine, the lead counsel for Ott knew the relevant facts all along,
but elected not to reveal them, again pointing to the conflict.
The State acknowledges that Ut, R. Prof Conduct 1.7 is relevant to the conflict of
interest inquiry, but argues as though Caine's only loyalty was to Susan Wilson, and not to Mel.

State's brief at 25-26. This argument is refuted by the State's acknowledgment that both Mel
Wilson and Caine stood to gain if they prevailed in the civil suit, although the State proceeds as
if an approximate or forgotten percentage of the contingency fee were a settled amount. State's
brief at 27. The State does not refute the fact that because Mel Wilson hired Caine to represent
Susan Wilson, and stood to gain from that suit, Mel Wilson constituted Caine's client in the civil
suit, e,g, Ut.R.Evid. 504(a)(1), or that Caine and Mel Wilson were acting as co-counsel in the civil
suit and jointly owed the Wilsons a duty of zealous representation at the time that Wilson was
prosecuting Caine's client for capital murder. The State does not contest that Wilson's and
Caine's failure to disclose the underlying facts to the court and unwillingness to discuss the
underlying facts with the defense investigator or counsel prior to the 23B hearing increased the
difficulty of proving prejudice and weighs in favor of a presumption of prejudice from their
arrangements. See Ott's opening brief at 33. The State does not address or refute Ott's
argument that Ut. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4, which forbids lawyers to practice in a manner which
prejudices the administration of justice, establishes a conflict of interest here. See State v.
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,489-90 (Utah App. 1991). The loyalties Caine owed to Wilson conflicted
with the duty of zealous representation Caine owed to Ott in this most serious capital
prosecution, which was a death case up until Ott pled on the first day of trial.
B.

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The State argues that Ott must show that an '"actual conflict of interest cause[d] a lapse

of representation contrary to the defendant's interests.'" State's brief at 29, quoting Stoia v.
United States. 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Or. 1994) (emphasis by the State). The State then faults Ott

2

for failing to provide direct evidence that Caine's representation of Susan Wilson caused any
of Caine's actions in Ott's case. State's brief at 29.* The emphasis on the word cause in the
quotation from the Seventh Circuit Stoia case was added by the State. The Stoia case does not
emphasize that term, or stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant must prove direct
proof of a causal link between a lawyer's conflict of interest and instances of that lawyer's poor
performance in order to prevail in challenging the conflict. Proof of what caused a lawyer to
perform in a deficient manner will always involve circumstantial evidence, because motive is not
something that can be observed by an eyewitness. Utah law does not require direct evidence of
cause in this arena, but instead considers various factors, including whether the lawyer took a
position directly contrary to the client's interests, whether the lawyer was required to make
choices to the client's detriment, Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^ 124, 196 P.3d 739, whether a
different lawyer would have handled the defendant's case differently than the actual lawyer did,
and whether the actual lawyer's performance was justified by a tactical reason, rather than the
conflict, State v. Lovell 1999 UT 40, ]} 24, 984 P.2d 382, cert denied, 528 U.S. 1083. Other
relevant factors include whether the lawyer informed the client of the relationship between
himself and the prosecutor, whether the client acquiesced to continuing {representation because
he believed he would benefit therefrom, whether the prosecutor had access to defense
information as a result of the relationship, whether there is evidence of improper conduct by the
defense lawyer or prosecutor, and whether it was possible for the defense lawyer to gain
anything by acting against the defendant's interests. See id. at ^J 25.
1

Here again, the State's argument minimizes the conflict as if it were stricdy tied to
the civil suit.
3

As is detailed in Ott's opening brief at 30-33, analysis of the relevant factors in this case
leads to the conclusion that the instances of deficient performance by Caine discussed in Point
II of Ott's opening brief constitute circumstantial proof that the actual conflict of interest
adversely impacted Caine's performance on Ott's behalf.
C.

GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION AND INTERFERENCE
In a footnote, the State contends that this Court should not address Ott's claim that

reversal is required by governmental intrusion into and interference with the attorney-client
relationship because the issue is inadequately briefed. State's brief at 29-30 n.7. Ut. R. App. P.
24(a)(9) requires attorneys to cite to the record in support of factual assertions and to provide
citations to legal authorities in support of the arguments. See id. Ott's brief complies with this
rule on pages 28-29 and 32-33.
On the merits, the State asserts that Wilson and Caine's discussion of defense strategy
was favorable to Ott, because it permitted Dr. Egli to testify unimpeached, and thus does not
establish governmental interference with or intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
State's brief at 30 n.7. The agreement between Caine and Wilson resulted in the exclusion of
key testimony explaining how Ott's criminal behavior was caused by mental illnesses, brain
injuries, and diagnostic and medication errors which were beyond Ott's control, evidence which
reasonably may have caused one additional juror to vote for life with parole. See Ott's opening
brief at 52-77. Wilson was in fact was able to effectively refute Dr. Egli by simply crossexamining Egli regarding the fact that Egli did not have time to review or access to the relevant
records, and regarding his huge caseload at the prison and his lack of time spent with and

4

familiarity with Ott. Wilson was able to emphasize the difficulty of insuring proper medication
for Ott's illness should he be released, and by arguing that Ott might not be properly medicated
in the future and ought not to be paroled. See R2166:61, R1378: 93-102, 104-06. In aid of the
prosecution's position on this point, the defense introduced evidence that Ott failed to take his
medication (R. 1376: 184, R. 1377: 202), and did not introduce Egli's key defense testimony that
Ott has a history of taking his medicine, that the medicine he at times had not taken was the
antidepressant which had catapulted him into manic phases (R2166:132). Nor did the defense
present essential defense testimony readily available from Dr. Egli that, given Ott's history of
more than forty years of obeying the law without violence, Ott was more likely to be treated
successfully (R2166: 114,129). Thus, the governmental interference with and intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship is not properly characterized as beneficial to Ott. Rather, it was
highly prejudicial.2
D.

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE,
INCLUDING THOSE WHICH PRECEDED THE PLEA, FOR EVIDENCE
OF THE IMPACT OF THE ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
The State argues that because Ott did not file a timely motion to withdraw his pleas, this

Court is jurisdictionally barred from considering whether the guilty plea and events which
preceded it were infected by trial counsel's detrimental choices and errors. State's brief at 32.

2

Compare Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977) (there was no prejudicial
interference with defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel stemming from codefendant/informant's presence at two meetings between defendant and his lawyer, despite
the fact that he had represented that he would not testify in the defendant's trial, because the
co-defendant/informant did not share defendant's strategy or information from meetings
with the prosecution, and because he came to the meetings at the request of defendant and
his counsel rather than as to eavesdrop for the prosecution).
5

This Court's decisions regarding the jurisdictional nature of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
do not address claims of conflict of interest, or insulate the conduct of trial lawyers prior to and
during the entry of pleas from scrutiny for conflicts of interest. See, e.g.. State v. Rhinehart.
2007 UT 61,1ffi 10-14, 167 P.3d 1046.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 does not limit the Court's ability to set aside flawed pleas once
the Court is aware of defects.3 Here, Caine's pleading Ott to aggravated murder without
properly investigating the underlying facts of the guilt or penalty phase cases, and despite the
evidence of Ott's incompetence to proceed and in the absence of legally adequate competency
evaluations, demonstrates that Caine was serving Wilson's interests to get the case tried quickly
to mollify the victims (R2166: 26, 85-86), rather than loyally and zealously representing Mark
Ott. This evidence demonstrates an actual conflict of interest and would be a proper basis for
a misplea. See, e.g., Lopez and Lovell, supra.
The State argues at various times that Ott has not established deficient performance or
prejudice from trial counsel's failures, such as the failure to investigate the case with a fact
investigator and mitigation expert prior to the penalty phase. E.g., State's brief at 37. Assuming
this arguendo, the fact that his lawyer pled him guilty and proceeded to try the penalty phase
without properly investigating the guilt or penalty phases and when Ott's incompetency was
plainly indicated, demonstrates that Caine was serving Wilson's interests to get the case tried

3

E.g., State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, % 19, 128 P.3d 1, cert, denied. 38 P.3d 589
(Utah 2006)(court properly declared misplea despite timely motion to withdraw under 77-136, because of concerns that defendant did not understand English in plea form). See also,
e.g.. State v. Horrocks. 2001 UT App 4,1f 16, 17 P.3d 1145 (detailing courts' misplea
powers).
6

quickly to mollify the victims (R2166: 26, 85-86), rather than loyally and zealously representing
Mark Ott. All instances of deficient performance by trial counsel ate thus pertinent to the
conflict of interest inquiry. See, e.g., Lovell supra.
II.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

OF

COUNSEL

AND

IMPACT OF

A.

FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNDERLYING FACTS AND MITIGATION
The State does not contest the failure of trial counsel to hire a fact investigator to

investigate the facts underlying the guilt and penalty phases in this capital case. Nor does the
State contest the proffer from the mitigation expert, Vera Ockenfels, or the testimony of Aric
Cramer, both of which reflect that the mitigation investigation was grossly incomplete when the
case went to trial. Compare Ott's opening brief at 39 with State's brief, passim. The State argues
that the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases do not apply in this case, because Ott's pleas removed the possibility of a death
sentence. State's brief at 36-37. Up until Ott pled the day his trial was began, the case was a
death penalty case, and his lawyers were obligated to investigate and prepare as if their client
faced the death penalty. Caine acknowledged that he was obligated by case law and his contract
with the Indigent Defense Trust Fund Board to follow the Guidelines (R2166: 18). Assuming
that the ABA Guidelines were somehow rendered inapplicable because Ott pled guilty in
exchange for the prosecution's not seeking the death penalty, trial counsel were independendy
obligated to fully investigate Ott's case by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 692 (1984), and
State v. Tempkn, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990).
The State summarizes the evidence which the defense presented in the mitigation case,
7

and faults Ott for failing to prove prejudice by specifying evidence which was not investigated
or presented. State's brief at 32-38.4 Ott was prejudiced both procedurally and evidentially by
the failure to fully investigate and prepare the defense case. Ott's opening brief at 39. The
failure to investigate resulted in Ott's pleading guilty and proceeding to the penalty phase trial
when the evidence before the court indicated that he was not competent to proceed. Ott's
opening brief at 39-52. The failure to investigate resulted in Ott's pleading guilty and proceeding
to the penalty phase, despite the fact that his lawyers believed incorrectly that he had no valid
guilt phase defenses, and could only assert a special mitigation defense and present general
mitigation in the penalty phase (R2166: 21-23, 51). Ott's special mitigation defense was valid
on the facts presented at the 23B hearing, but by statute could only be raised in the guilt phase.
Ott's imperfect self defense claim and involuntariness defenses also could have been raised in
the guilt phase, but were not recognized by the trial lawyers, because they did not investigate and
prepare their case. See Ott's opening brief at 62-64. Ott was prejudiced because the only expert
who presented mental health testimony on Ott's behalf, Dr. Egli, was not given an opportunity
to review a proper mitigation investigation prior to testifying, and was called upon to present a
mitigation defense which was severely and intentionally limited to Ott's detriment by Caine's
agreement with Wilson. See, e.g., Ott's opening brief at 52-64.
Caine's performance in the foregoing respects are pervasive examples of his making
choices to Ott's detriment and Wilson's benefit.
4

See Lovell supra. The actual conflict of

The State opposed Ott's efforts in this Court to obtain time, funding and a remand
for completion of the mitigation investigation prior to the 23B hearing. In the event this
Court will permit it, counsel for Ott will complete the mitigation investigation and present
additional evidence at a second remand hearing.
8

interest alleviates the need for Ott to establish traditional prejudice. See: Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446
U.S. 335, 360 (1980).
B.

MISHANDLING OF OTT'S COMPETENCY AND MENTAL HEALTH
ISSUES BEFORE LEARNING OF DR. EGLI'S DIAGNOSES OF OTT
The State claims that Ott failed to show record support that he was incompetent at the

time of trial. State's brief at 39. The record evidence that Ott was incompetent includes the
contents of the competency petition filed by trial counsel, Ott's diagnoses of bipolar disorder,
PTSD, and other serious mental illnesses, Ott's receiving medication for serious mental illnesses
prior to and during the trial, Ott's attempting suicide numerous times prior to the and during the
crimes and prior to the trial, the tapes of the extradition hearings from Idaho which reflect that
Ott was not tracking mentally, Ott's referring to hearing voices prior to the crimes, and Ott's
. being unable to recollect the crimes. See Ott's opening brief at 41-46. The crimes at issue were
clearly reflective of severe mental illness, and the overbroad report of Nillson and Porter
indicated that they crimes were likely significantly contributed to by Ott's mental illnesses.
Nillson report at 12-13. Dr. Egli's testimony during the trial that Ott was in the process of
getting his emotions and ability to express them under control and was getting his mood
stabilized, but was still in the process of getting his medication evaluated at the time of trial
likewise stands as record support that Ott was incompetent when he pled and was tried. See,
e.g. Ott's brief at 41, 48-49. Egli's testimony that people with Ott's illnesses are frequently
delusional, out of control, disproportionately reactive, and unable to understand other people's
or their own behavior (R2155:110-113) likewise supports the notion that Ott pled and was tried
while incompetent, particularly given that his medications and ability to control and express his
9

emotions were not stabilized at the time of trial. See, e.g., Ott's brief at 49. The mental health
records the defense subpoenaed from the prison months prior to trial reflect that Ott was
psychotic, suicidal, unable to control his emotions, had been diagnosed with PTSD and was
being medicated for bipolar disorder, had experienced hallucinations and memory lapses, and
was being treated by the mental health team in hopes that he could handle the court proceedings
without losing control (R 1966-2006). Of particular note is the entry reflecting the "high risk
for suicidal be[ha]vior, especially during the first few weeks of August, when he returns to court
on capit[a]l murder and arson charges" (R1980).5 During the plea colloquy, Ott sought no
clarification of ambiguities in the plea form regarding the extent to which he waived his right to
appeal, and initially informed the judge that he was not under the influence of medications,
despite the fact that he was (R. 1372:1-32).
The State claims that Ott failed to show that the two competency reports were incorrect.
State's brief at 39-40. The legal inadequacy of the evaluations is detailed in Ott's opening brief
at pages 43-44.
The State faults Ott for failing to present authority in support of his contentions that trial
counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner in how they handled the competency and
insanity evaluations. State's brief at 38-40. Ott's opening brief cites to the ABA standards and
statutory and constitutional law which trial counsel breached or failed to assert, and the record
citations to the expert testimony presented by Lynn Donaldson at the 23B hearing. See Ott's

5

While Ott's case was continued well past August, his vulnerability to the stress of trial
was well-documented in the competency report of Drs. Nillson and Porter, discussed at
pages 33-34 of Ott's opening brief.
10

opening brief at 40-52.
The State claims that Ott has not shown that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
performance. State's brief at 40. Because Ott has shown a reasonable probability that he pled
to aggravated murder and other serious offenses and was tried while incompetent, he has
established prejudice under the governing law. See e.g., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508,
1520 (10th Cir. 1997).
Caine's performance in the foregoing respects demonstrates that his conflict of interest
stemming from his loyalties owed to the prosecutor adversely impacted his representation of
Ott. This alleviates the burden to show prejudice. E.g., Lovell, Cuyler, supra.
C. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT EVIDENCE OF OTT'S BIPOLAR
DISORDER, PTSD, AND BRAIN DAMAGE.
The State seeks to uphold the trial court's finding that Caine only became aware of the
bipolar disorder evidence when Ott told him about it less than 30 days before trial. State's brief
at 41. While this version of events is consistent with Caine's initial affidavit and testimony under
oath, the truth, to which he admitted at the 23B hearing, and which is confirmed by the
testimony of his co-counsel Aric Cramer, is that the defense lawyers knew about the bipolar
diagnosis and sought and obtained records regarding the diagnosis months before Ott pled
guilty, and had plenty of time to comply with the expert witness requirement. See Ott's opening
brief at 54, 57.6 The record further disproves the notion that Caine was operating under a
carefully crafted agreement with Wilson to get Dr. Egli's testimony admitted without

6

The State's brief itself appears to reflect skepticism of Caine's original claim, noting
that "the trial court apparently accepted this testimony as true." State's brief at 48.
11

impeachment, given that Wilson apparently only learned that Ott had been diagnosed with
bipolar disorder on the first day of trial. After Ott pled and before jury selection began, when
Caine was clarifying that Ott was actually under the influence of his prescription medications at
the time of the plea, Wilson asked Ott if his anti-anxiety medication was the only one he was
taking (R. 1372: 31). When Ott informed him that he was taking medication for bipolar
disorder, the prosecutor responded, "It's for bi-polar disorder?" (R. 1372: 31). After Ott
confirmed that it was, the prosecutor asked him what effect the medication had, and after Ott
began explaining how the medication calmed him down and that he had not had the problems
at the prison that he had experienced at the jail, the prosecutor responded, "Appreciate that."
(R. 1372: 32). Given that the prosecutor was apparently unaware of the bipolar issue until the
trial had begun, it appears that Caine had no safe plan in place to get Dr. Egli's testimony
admitted at all, let alone in some highly beneficial fashion.
The State seeks to uphold the trial court's finding regarding when Caine learned of Ott's
bipolar disorder by contending that there was only one reference to bipolar disorder which was
"buried" in the 40 pages of prison records. State's brief page 48. The records from the prison
which were subpoenaed by the defense and sent to Aric Cramer on December 12,2003, months
before trial began, reflect an entry dated 8/23/2003, wherein Ott discussed extreme mood shifts
and the decision of Dr, Egli to rule out "bipolar disorder depressed [major]" and to prescribe
Zyprexa "as a mood stabilizer." (R. 1984).

An entry from 9/18/2003 reflects that his

prescription for Zyprexa would be changed to Seroquel, another mood stabilizer, because of side
effects (R1993). An entry on 10/20/03 indicates that Ott requested to be put back on Zyprexa

12

because it "balances him out" (R1999). The 11/7/2003 entry reflects further efforts to medicate
Ott to correct his mood cycling and stabilize his moods (2004). These notes are all reflective of
Ott's bipolar disorder, see, e ^ , R2166: 97-98, 100, R 1892-1918, and would have been readily
understood by Caine, given the literature Caine kept on bipolar disorder (R 1892-1918) and his
personal studies of the illness which his other clients and own son had (R2166:25, 39, 40).
The State continues as if the agreement Caine reached with Wilson was beneficial because
this agreement foreclosed Wilson's impeachment of Egli with the sealed materials or calling of
a rebuttal expert. State's brief at 42-45. The record belies the notion that Caine was operating
according to a properly investigated or strategic plan, because Caine called Egli to testify only
a few days before trial, and did not provide him with an opportunity to review his own records,
let alone the records and materials gathered by the mitigation expert and other mental health
professionals who had assessed Ott (R. 1378: 101; R2166:96-133). Caine's failure to operate
according to a carefully crafted plan by preparing and investigating the case provided the
prosecutor with excellent material with which to impeach Egli, which he used (R. 1378:101-02).
The notion that the defense was acting pursuant to a carefully crafted plan with regard to Dr.
Egli's testimony is similarly refuted by the fact that the defense presented evidence which
supported the prosecution's countervailing point, that Ott should not be paroled because he had
a history of not taking his medications (R1376:184, R1377: 202, R1378:28-32). Moreover, the
defense did not present the key testimony that Ott has a history of taking his medicine, that the
medicine he at times had not taken was the antidepressant which had catapulted him into manic
phases, and that given Ott's history of more than forty years of obeying the law without

13

violence, Ott was more likely to be treated successfully (R2166: 114, 129, 132).
The State asserts that Caine opted to use Egli as an expert, and limit his testimony in
exchange for Wilson's abstaining from cross-examining Egli with the sealed materials, because
Egli had personal contact with Ott, diagnosed him and saw him improve once he was properly
medicated. State's brief at 43-44, 49. The prosecutor was able to effectively refute Egli's
opinions because his contact with Ott was very limited as a result of his huge case load at the
prison, and because he had not have time to review the relevant records prior to testifying (R.
2166:61, R1378: 93-102,104-06). The State's contention that the sealed impeachment materials
could have been used to question "Dr. Egli's methods of determining the proper dosage for a
bipolar patient" mis-perceives that it was relevant to Ott's jury whether Ott was properly
medicated by Egli at the prison. The fact that Ott's crimes were so likely heavily influenced by
his genetic bipolar disorder, which had not been diagnosed and which was exacerbated as a
result of medications prescribed by the doctors who missed the diagnosis, was something that
Ott's jurors should have been made fully aware of, so that they could assess Ott's moral
culpability. See Ott's opening brief at 63, 72-77.
The State points to Caine's testimony that as a result of his son's own bipolar disorder,
Caine was personally aware of a way to refute Egli's testimony, State's brief at 43, but does not
acknowledge Caine's testimony that he was not aware of any rebuttal evidence the State had with
regard to Dr. Egli's testimony (R2166:67). Nor does the State acknowledge Caine's testimony
that Dr. Egli's testimony regarding Ott's mental illnesses, improper medication and
consequential manic behavior during the crimes was very standard and textbook, and that Egli's
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diagnoses of Ott were correct (R2166:72).
With regard to Caine's failure to present Dr. Egli's or another expert's testimony
reflecting that Ott's crimes and violent episodes were likely influenced by his PTSD and brain
injuries, the State relies heavily on the trial court's finding that Caine strategically opted to
exclude this evidence, because the jury would likely choose the life without parole option
because those conditions cannot be treated. State's brief at 45-47, 50-51. The record before this
Court, however, demonstrates that Caine did not make a strategic choice to withhold any mental
illness evidence from the jury. Rather, Caine testified that it was his articulated strategy to
provide the jurors with comprehensive evidence concerning Ott's mental illnesses, including
Ott's brain damage and PTSD (R2166:52-53). Concerns about Ott's amenability to treatment
would have been addressed by Egli's testimony that Ott's history of more than forty years of
obeying the law without

violence demonstrated that Ott was more likely to be treated

successfully (R2166:114,129,132). The presentation of and failure to present the mental health
evidence in this case was uniformed, haphazard, and cannot be accurately characterized as a
reasonable or strategic choice. See Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Or. 2002).
The State's suggestion that Caine's argument to the jury, which went beyond his
agreement with Wilson and the evidence which was presented, adequately informed the jurors
that Ott was likely manic on the night of the crimes, e.g.. State's brief at 50, does not account
for the procedural prejudice Ott suffered as a result of his lawyers' failure to research and
understand the evidence and potential defenses it supported, or the importance of giving jurors
detailed and understandable expert testimony regarding how his mental illnesses and improperly
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prescribed medications influence and/or caused Ott's crimes. See Ott's opening brief at 65-69,
12-11. The argument also overlooks the fact that Ott's jurors were instructed that arguments
of counsel are not to be treated as evidence, and that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
to this effect (R1147; R2166:67). See, e ^ , State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998).
In addition to being objectively deficient, trial counsel's performance in this area was
prejudicial, because the failure to investigate and prepare the evidence foreclosed Ott's ability
to choose whether to assert the evidence as a defense in the guilt phase, whether through a
special mitigation case, an imperfect self defense claim, or an involuntariness defense. The State
never refutes Ott's ability to raise these defenses, and never defends or mentions Caine's
misunderstanding of the law governing the special mitigation statute and other defenses.
Compare Ott's opening brief at 65-69 with State's brief passim. The failure to investigate and
prepare the mental health evidence deprived Ott's jurors of the pertinent evidence reflecting that
his horrific crimes were largely if not wholly the result of illnesses and medication errors which
were beyond Ott's control. There is a reasonable likelihood that Ott would not have pled guilty,
and that at least one more juror would have extended the hope of eventual parole to him had
trial counsel properly investigated and presented the relevant evidence. Accordingly, prejudice
is established. See, Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52,29 (1985); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,537
(2003).
Caine's performance regarding the mental health issues demonstrates repeatedly that he
was making choices to Ott's detriment, which served the interests of the prosecutor, to expedite
the trial for the victims (R2166: 26, 85-86). This demonstrates an actual conflict of interest,
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which alleviates the need for the prejudice inquiry. See, e.g., LovelL supra.
D.

FAILURE T O O B J E C T T O A N O N Y M O U S JURY
The State correctly observes that Ott forfeited his right to the presumption of innocence

when he pled, and thus, the anonymous jury proceedings did not violate that right. State's brief
at 52. The likelihood that the one of the ten jurors who voted to imprison Ott for life was
influenced to do so by the anonymous jury proceedings remains to be determined.
The State argues as if Ott's jurors were led by the Court to believe that the procedures
were employed to protect their privacy from the press and to encourage their truthfulness during
voir dire. State's brief at 58. This view fails to account for the trial court's concomitantly telling
the jurors to enter the court through a special entrance which would require them to provide
their juror numbers, and would be issued special passcards to enter the building, to keep them
secure (R. 1373 at 177). Given these facts, the more reasonable inference the jurors drew was
that they were being treated in this peculiarly protective way because they were in danger.
The State argues that because there was no law proscribing the use of anonymous juries
at the time Ott's jury was impaneled, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to object
to the anonymous jury procedures used in Ott's case. State's brief at 52-54. With the exception
of State v. Brown. 118 P.3d 1273 (Kan. 2005), the authorities relied on in Ott's opening brief,
including Ut. R. Crim. P. 18, which requires jurors to be called by name, were in existence and
readily available to trial counsel. See Ott's opening brief at 78-85. Brown relies on many cases
and law review articles which were readily available to trial counsel at the time of Ott's trial.
Assuming arguendo that Rule 18 did not clearly indicate that jurors are supposed to be called by
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name in Utah courts, a Rule 8 qualified lawyer appointed to represent an indigent capital
defendant is expected to take the time required to research a proposed change of standard jury
selection procedures. See ABA Guideline 10.10.2. In addition to requiring lawyers to assert all
established points of law which clearly supports their client's rights, the ABA Guidelines require
counsel to anticipate and assert potential changes in controlling precedents which might be of
benefit to the clients. See, Guideline 10.8 and commentary. Given the well-established law
reflected in our own Rule 18 and the case law which uniformly frowns on anonymous jury
procedures because they make the jurors think the defendant poses a threat to them, State v.
Brown, 118 P.3d 1273, 1279-81 (Kan. 2005) (citing multiple cases and law review articles), trial
counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner in failing to object to the anonymous jury
proceedings.
The State's suggests that Ott has not shown prejudice because an objection would have
been futile in light of State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, f 41, 174 P.3d 628. State's brief at 55-56.
Ross was not decided at the time the objection should have been made. Had trial counsel
objected and alerted the court to the dangers posed by anonymous jury procedures, and the need
to ameliorate the recognized threat to the fairness of the trial posed by juror anonymity, there
is a reasonable likelihood that the court would have recognized that Ott's jurors faced no
compelling threats and followed Rule 18 and the authorities such as those discussed in Brown,
relied on the decorum order to protect the jurors from the press (Rl 109-1114), and relied on
and perhaps emphasized the jurors' oaths to be truthful in voir dire (R1371: 3). The court may
have given the cautionary instructions to the jurors, which Ott's jurors never received, them that
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they were not to hold their anonymous status against Ott in their deliberations. See Ross, at fflj
44-45. The State posits that any threat felt by Ott's jurors which caused them to ask the trial
court to maintain their identity stemmed from evidence that Ott held a grudge forever and was
vengeful, rather than the anonymous jury proceedings. State's brief at 59 n.13. This evidence
was put on by the defense lawyers, Ott's opening brief at 21-22, and constituted additional
indicia of incompetence by the defense, which did nothing to diminish the dangers inherent in
anonymous jury procedures.
Particularly given the recognized tendency of anonymous jury procedures to prejudice
the jurors against the defendants, e.g.. Brown, and given the amorphous decision Utah juries are
expected to make in choosing whether or not to impose the life without parole sentence, there
is a reasonable likelihood that at least one more of Ott's jurors would have joined the other two
who voted for life with parole. Trial counsel's failure to object to the anonymous jury
proceedings was thus prejudicial.
Caine's performance in this instance once again demonstrates that Caine made a choice
to Ott's detriment and in Wilson's favor. This additional impact from the actual conflict of
interest alleviates the need for Ott to show prejudice. See Taylor, supra,
E.

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
The State argues that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of victim impact

evidence was not deficient, because the evidence in question was clearly admissible under Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), except perhaps for the musical accompaniment to the "Meet
Lacey Lawrence" videotape, which the State feels may have been unduly prejudicial and
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compromised the fairness of the trial. State's brief at 61-62. The State argues that trial counsel
had no obligation to assert a challenge to the victim impact evidence under state law, apparently
because the State views Utah law as unsettled. State's brief at 61-63.
The Payne decision, which excludes victim impact evidence which is so prejudicial as to
jeopardize the fairness of a criminal trial, expressly recognizes that the decision is premised on
principles of federalism, which hold state courts responsible to devise procedures for criminal
trials, and which limit the supreme court's constitutional decisions to bedrock principles. 501
U.S. at 824-25. Particularly under our federalist system of government, appointed rule 8
qualified capital lawyers in this state are fairly expected to familiarize themselves with this
Court's decisions in important death penalty cases such as State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah),
cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995), and State v. Kell 2002 UT 106, 61 P.3d 1019, and are fairly
expected to honor their oaths to uphold the state constitution, and to heed this Court's
precedents which require trial lawyers to raise state constitutional arguments in the trial courts,
e ^ , State v. Earl 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).
The State argues that this Court should not address the state constitutional boundaries
on victim impact evidence in this case, because that issue was not properly briefed. State's brief
at 62-63 and n.14. Ott's opening brief challenges trial counsel's failure to raise either a state or
federal constitutional objection premised on seven pages of the pertinent statute, constitutional
provisions, state court discussions and the controlling federal law. See opening brief at 86-92.
Particularly given that the brief argues that trial counsel should have made an objection on the
basis of this law, it does not appear that there is a state constitutional briefing deficiency. While
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this Court need not reach the state constitutional issue because the evidence presented in this
case violated the federal standard of Payne, particularly given the instability of federal law in this
area, see, e.g.. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, supra,
this Court should base its holding under the Utah Constitution, and again reiterate the duty of
trial lawyers to raise state constitutional claims. E.g., Earl, supra.
By reviewing the evidence in question, including the transcript of the family members'
testimonies and particularly the "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape, this Court can readily
confirm that the penalty phase of this trial was heavily weighted with unduly prejudicial victim
impact evidence, even if Payne were the only authority a Rule 8 qualified lawyer were expected
to know about or assert on his client's behalf

But see, e.g., ABA Guideline 10.8 and

commentary (requiring appointed capital defense lawyers to vigorously assert all potential legal
claims on their clients' behalf).
The State argues that trial counsel made a legitimate strategic choice to admit the victim
impact evidence because this allowed Ott to accept responsibility for his crimes and to show
empathy for his victims. State's brief at 63-66. Even actual tactical decisions reflected in the
record are still reviewed for reasonableness. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989).
The family members' testimony regarding their excruciating pain and grief and the "Meet Lacey
Lawrence" videotape did nothing to establish that Ott took responsibility for the victims' pain
and loss or was remorseful. Ott accepted responsibility when he pled to aggravated murder and
multiple other serious felony offenses (Rl 121-1133,1135). He accepted responsibility again in
front of the jury in allocution (R1378:134). He apologized to Terry Cook and, indicated that
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particularly after having seen the video, "Meet Lacey Lawrence," and after not being able to see
his own children, had a better understanding of her grief (R1378 134-35)

His mentioning of

the videotape in the allocution added nothing to his expression of remorse, and indeed, may
have undercut it, given that he chose to juxtapose his own pam with Lacey's mother's.
Came could not have had a valid trial strategy to permit the jurors to be deluged with so
much incredibly damaging and moving victim impact evidence, which undoubtedly left them
feeling compelled to do the only thing they could do for Lacey Lawrence's family - mete out the
most severe sentence for Ott The failure to object does not reflect reasonable trial strategy by
a competent advocate in our adversarial system Rather, it reflects his failure to research and
understand the law governing victim impact evidence, and failure to research and understand
the law governing his performance as an appointed lawyer in a death penalty case, who must
preserve his client's legal claims and limit the introduction of such devastating evidence. See,
eg., ABA guideline 10.8. Compare Fishery Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Or. 2002).
Caine's agreement that Wilson should be allowed to show the videotape to the jury came
in conjunction with Caine's acknowledgment that he and Wilson had talked, and the defense
lawyers were willing to relax the evidentiary standards for the capital penalty phase hearing (R
1374: 7-8). These concessions are fairly assessed m light of the additional agreement of Came
and Wilson to keep that tape out of evidence (R 1377 7), as additional instances of Caine's
acting on his allegiance to his friendship with Wilson, at the expense of his capital client. See,
e.g. Lovell, supra.
F.

FAILURE TO PROTECT THE RECORD
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The State does not dispute that Caine had the responsibility to insure that his capital
client's record was complete for purposes of appeal. See Ott's opening brief at 96-98.
Nonetheless, the State characterizes as "frivolous" Ott's complaints about trial counsel's failure
to insure that the record was complete with all of the recordings that were played to the jury, and
his explicit agreement with the prosecutor to keep the most critical ones out. State's brief at 6668. While the Attorney General's Office has stipulated to the supplementation of the record
with those exhibits which can be found, at the time that trial counsel agreed to keep them out
he had no way of knowing that the record would be supplemented, or that it would be possible
to do so. Indeed, the power point presentation, through which the mitigation expert presented
the majority of the defense case in the penalty phase, characterized as "irrelevant" by the State,
remains missing.
The State notes that Caine and Wilson agreed to keep the recordings out of the record
because they did not want the jurors to have them during deliberations, State's brief at 68 n.15,
but does not explain any rationale as to why the jurors were not entitled to the exhibits they had
already seen and/or heard in court, or why this Court would properly have been denied the
opportunity to review the key exhibits at the time that Caine and Wilson agreed to keep them
out of evidence. If this Court will review the "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape and the Idaho
court audiotapes, the Court will confirm that the exclusion of those exhibits from the evidence
in the record intended by the agreement of Caine and Wilson would have significantly undercut
Ott's appeal. This again demonstrates the conflict of interest, because the agreement reflects one
more choice that Caine made to Ott's detriment. See Lovell, supra.
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G. FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE STATUTE
The State claims that Caine brought an untimely and largely unsupported challenge to the
life without parole statute because Ott and counsel waived any challenge when Ott agreed that
the jury would choose between the life with and without parole sentences. State's brief at 68.
It is true that Ott's plea agreement reflects that the jury would determine whether the court
would impose a sentence of life with or without the possibility of parole (R. 1129). However,
no part of the plea form indicates any understanding on Ott's part that he was waiving any legal
challenge to any statute used to prosecute or sentence him (R. 1121-31). The plea colloquy,
which informed Ott of the rights he waived, did not inform him that he was waiving the right
to challenge the life without parole statute (R1372: 1-26).
The State argues as if Caine strategically waited to challenge the life without parole
sentencing statute until after the conviction entered, in a motion to arrest judgment, to avoid
having the plea set aside for breach of the agreement to let the jury decide between life with and
without parole. State's brief at 70. It appears that mispleas may be declared after sentence is
imposed in any event, see, e.g., Lopez, supra and State v. Shubarth. 2005 UT App 166, 2005 WL
775385 (remanding for declaration of misplea in an appeal from a final judgment, sentence and
commitment), so Ott would have been at equal risk of a misplea, regardless of whether Caine
filed a timely motion in arrest of judgment before sentence or a motion for a new trial after
sentence. Ott was trying to withdraw his plea after the trial, but could not get Caine to respond
to his requests (R1299, 1300, 1303), so a misplea would not have prejudiced Ott.
The State contends that there was no settled law holding the life without parole statute
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unconstitutional. State's brief at 72. Appointed capital trial lawyers are expected to go beyond
settled law, and make all potential legal challenges in their clients' behalf. See, e.g., ABA
Guideline 10.8 and commentary, supra. Lawyers in this State have been encouraged by this
Court to raise state constitutional claims, e^g., Earl supra, and are under oath to uphold the Utah
Constitution. Particularly in a death penalty case, a rule 8 qualified lawyer is fairly expected to
read the plain language of the Utah Constitution and research fundamental state constitutional
law and apply it to the issues applicable to the case. See ABA Guideline 10.8, supra.
In a footnote, the State partially addresses Article VII § 12 of the Utah Constitution, and
claims that under this provision, the legislature may enact statutes which prohibit the board of
pardons from granting parole in cases involving other offenses than treason and impeachment.
State's brief at 73 n.16. As Ott's opening brief explains on pages 99 and 100, the legislature's
authority to implement statutes regulating the granting of parole does not permit it to enact
statutes which expand the list of crimes for which parole may not be granted (treason and
impeachment), as the life without parole statute purports to do. Caine's failure to make a timely
and properly briefed challenge to the statute was objectively deficient and prejudicial and evinces
that the actual conflict of interest adversely impacted his performance on Ott's behalf.
CONCLUSION
Because Ott has demonstrated multiple errors causing significant evidentiary and
procedural prejudice, this Court should grant Ott full relief, and may employ the plain error,
exceptional circumstances and cumulative error doctrines in doing so.
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